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State	aid	and	Brexit:	the	temptation	for	political
intervention
State	aid	is	currently	regulated	by	the	EU	and,	after	Brexit,	the	government	intends	to	transpose
the	rules	into	UK	legislation,	with	the	Competitions	and	Markets	Authority	overseeing	the
issue.	Totis	Kotsonis	(Eversheds	Sutherland)	explains	why	future	governments	could	be
tempted	to	allow	political	intervention	that	EU	membership	precludes.	
The	UK	government	has	recently	indicated	its	intention	to	transpose	the	EU	state	aid	rules	into
domestic	legislation,	even	in	the	event	of	the	UK	exiting	the	EU	without	a	withdrawal
agreement.	This	policy	is	the	natural	consequence	of	the	government’s	strongly	held	belief	that	“a	rigorous	state	aid
system…	is	good	for	taxpayers,	consumers,	and	for	businesses”.	Indeed,	unregulated	state	aid	interventions,
whether	at	the	local,	devolved	or	central	government	level,	can	distort	domestic	competition,	affect	trade	and	have	an
adverse	effect	on	the	competitiveness	of	the	UK	economy.
At	the	same	time,	the	implementation	of	a	purely	domestic	state	aid	regime	–	that	is	a	regime,	which	the	state	sets	up
voluntarily,	rather	than	implements	as	a	result	of	an	international	treaty	obligation,	is	likely	to	give	rise	to	a	number	of
issues	which	would	require	careful	consideration.
Stonor	Forest	in	the	Chilterns.	Britain’s	most	recent	case	under	EU	state	aid	rules	concerned
aid	for	forestry.	The	Commission	decided	not	to	raise	objections.	Photo:	Scott	Wylie	via	a	CC
BY	2.0	licence
The	EU	state	aid	framework
EU	state	aid	rules	generally	prohibit	EU	Member	States	from	using	state	resources	to	grant	aid	selectively	to
“undertakings”	(essentially	businesses	offering	goods	or	services	on	the	market),	to	the	extent	that	such	aid	may
distort	competition	and	affect	trade	between	Member	States	(the	“general	state	aid	prohibition”).	At	the	same	time,
State	aid	rules	set	out	the	types	of	aid	which	are,	or	may	be,	deemed	compatible	with	EU	law.
The	EU	State	aid	system	is	regulated	by	the	European	Commission	which	has	sole	responsibility	for	determining
whether	a	state	aid	measure	is	compatible	with	EU	law	requirements.	Accordingly,	other	than	in	cases	where	an
exemption	applies,	Member	States	have	an	obligation	to	notify	proposed	state	aid	to	the	Commission	for
authorisation.	State	aid	which	is	found	to	have	been	implemented	illegally	must	normally	be	recovered	from	the
beneficiary	with	interest.
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The	“no	deal”	Brexit	domestic	state	aid	framework
According	to	the	notice,	the	EU	state	aid	framework	will	be	transposed	into	UK	law	by	means	of	secondary	legislation
under	the	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Act	2018,	this	autumn,	with	only	“technical	modifications”	to	ensure	that	the
state	aid	regime	works	in	a	domestic	context.	The	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	(CMA)	will	take	on	the	role	of
domestic	state	aid	regulator	and	will	issue	further	guidance	in	early	2019,	setting	out	in	more	detail	how	it	will	operate
its	state	aid	regulatory	function.
As	regards	the	practical	implications	for	state	aid	regulation	in	the	event	of	a	“no	deal”	Brexit,	the	notice	indicates
that,	in	such	an	event:
•	UK	public	bodies	would	be	required	to	notify	aid	to	the	CMA	as	they	previously	would	have	done	to	the
Commission;
	•	state	aid	that	has	already	been	approved	prior	to	Brexit	would	remain	valid;
•	any	full	notifications	not	already	approved	by	the	Commission	prior	to	Brexit	would	have	to	be	submitted	to	the	CMA
for	approval	instead;	and
•	state	aid	complaints	should	be	directed	to	the	CMA.
The	notice	does	not	clarify	whether,	in	the	event	of	a	“no	deal”	Brexit,	the	intention	is	for	the	domestic	state	aid
regime	to	continue	to	“approximate”	EU	state	aid	rules	as	a	matter	of	course	or	whether	it	might	deviate	from	the	EU
state	aid	rulebook	as	the	CMA	considers	appropriate.
How	the	general	State	aid	prohibition	might	be	transposed	into	UK	law
It	is	a	given	that	in	transposing	the	EU	state	aid	framework	into	UK	law	there	would	be	a	need	for	certain	changes	to
the	rules	to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	these	would	now	operate	in	a	purely	domestic	context.	UK	state	aid	law
would	only	be	concerned	with	distortions	of	competition	and	effects	on	trade	within	the	UK.	The	notice	refers	to	this
type	of	adaptations	as	“technical	modifications”.	However,	their	effect	might	be	decidedly	greater	than	this
nomenclature	might	suggest.
Narrower	test,	wider	scope	for	state	aid	intervention?
In	certain	cases,	this	might	mean	that	the	narrower	domestic	test	would	lead	to	the	state	having	a	wider	scope	for
state	aid	intervention.	A	simple	example	might	be	where	the	decision	is	taken	to	relax	the	conditions,	including	by
increasing	the	amounts	of	aid	which	are	permissible	in	the	UK,	under	the	equivalent	to	the	Commission’s	General
Block	Exemption	Regulation.	This	sets	out	the	conditions	(including	maximum	aid	amounts)	on	the	basis	of	which
certain	categories	of	aid	are	deemed	compatible	with	EU	state	aid	rules	and	may	be	granted	without	prior	notification
to	the	Commission.	Another	example	might	be	where	a	decision	is	taken	to	diverge	from	the	EU	state	aid	“rulebook”
and	relax	UK	state	aid	rules	in	areas	such	as	aviation,	environmental	protection	or	indeed,	rescue	and	restructuring
aid.
The	adoption	of	such	measures	at	a	national	level	would	clearly	be	selective,	discriminatory	and	distortive	of
competition	if	implemented	unilaterally	by	an	EU	Member	State	and	assessed	by	reference	to	their	effect	in	the
context	of	the	internal	market.	Equally,	it	is	very	likely	that	such	an	approach	would	be	inconsistent	with	the	terms	of
a	theoretical	future	UK-EU	trade	agreement	were	this	to	provide	that,	any	state	aid	granted	by	the	UK	or	the	EU
Member	States	which	distorts	or	threatens	to	distort	competition	by	favouring	certain	undertakings	is	incompatible
with	that	agreement	in	so	far	as	it	may	affect	trade	between	the	parties.
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On	the	other	hand,	the	relaxation	of	state	aid	rules	might	be	deemed	to	be	justifiable	in	a	UK	“no	deal”	Brexit	context,
on	the	basis	of	an	analysis	that	demonstrates	that	to	do	so	does	not	distort	competition	in	the	UK	or	to	the	extent	that
it	does	the	distortions	are	not	significant	and	any	negative	effects	are	outweighed	by	the	benefits	obtained.	While	the
UK	would	still	need	to	be	mindful	of	its	obligations	under	the	WTO’s	Agreement	on	Subsidies	and	Countervailing
Measures	(ASCM),	in	reality,	ASCM’s	scope	is	narrower	and	the	ability	of	a	WTO	member	to	take	action	limited	to
those	cases	where	there	is	injury	to	its	domestic	industry,	market	access	impairment	or	“serious	prejudice”	to	its
interests.	In	practice,	this	means	that	depending	on	the	type	and	extent	of	any	relaxation	of	state	aid	rules	in	the	UK,
the	likelihood	of	this	raising	issues	under	the	WTO’s	ASCM	can	be	limited.
Accordingly,	if	the	intention	is	to	allow	UK	state	aid	rules	to	diverge	subsequently	from	EU	state	aid	rules,	it	would	be
important	to	establish	who	would	determine	the	timing,	scope	and	extent	of	such	divergence.	Would	it	be	correct	to
assume	that	this	would	be	for	the	CMA	alone	to	determine	or	would	it	be	possible	for	the	government	to	provide	the
CMA	with	directions	or	guidance	in	this	regard	or	indeed,	to	intervene	in	relation	to	state	aid	measures	which	the
government	considers	appropriate	to	implement	irrespective	of	the	tate	aid	analysis?
The	risk	of	political	intervention	in	a	domestic	state	aid	framework
First,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	whilst	the	CMA’s	new	state	aid	regulatory	function	would	also	be	concerned
with	the	regulation	of	competition	in	the	UK,	it	would,	in	fact,	be	significantly	different	from	its	other	regulatory
responsibilities.	Under	its	current	remit	as	competition	regulator	and	enforcer,	the	CMA	is	essentially	concerned	with
the	behaviour	of	businesses	(and	those	involved	in	their	running).	Under	a	domestic	state	aid	regime	the	CMA	would
be	tasked	with	the	role	of	regulating	the	behaviour	of	the	state,	prohibiting	it	from	using	state	resources	to	grant	aid
selectively	if	that	risks	distorting	competition,	and	presumably	requiring	it	to	recover	such	aid	where	this	has	been
granted	illegally.	In	this	context,	the	CMA	would	be	taking	decisions	which	can	prove	unpopular	not	only	with	the
public	but	also	with	the	government.
Whilst	it	is	true	that	certain	EU	state	aid	decisions	can	also	give	rise	to	public	and	political	discontent,	the	regime’s
supranational	character	means	that	the	ability	of	a	Member	State	to	influence	the	state	aid	process	(outside	the
normal	regulatory	procedures)	is	generally	limited.	In	any	event,	the	impact	of	any	such	attempts	can	be	diluted	given
the	Commission’s	obligation	to	take	into	account	the	effects	of	an	aid	measure	across	an	internal	market	of	28	(soon
to	be	27)	EU	Member	States.
However,	in	the	context	of	a	national	state	aid	system,	the	temptation	might	be	far	greater	for	politicians	and	indeed,
other	stakeholders	to	try	and	exert	pressure	on	the	domestic	state	aid	regulator	whether	through	media	campaigns	or
otherwise.
Separately,	it	is	relevant	to	note	that	under	EU	state	aid	rules	it	is,	in	fact,	possible	for	Member	States	to	intervene	in
the	state	aid	process.	More	specifically,	Article	108(2)	TFEU,	enables	the	Council	(of	EU	Ministers),	acting
unanimously,	at	the	request	of	a	Member	State,	and	where	this	is	justified	“by	exceptional	circumstances”,	to	declare
a	specific	state	aid	measure	as	compatible	with	EU	state	aid	rules.	In	those	circumstances,	the	Commission	cannot
investigate	the	particular	measure,	or	to	the	extent	that	it	has	commenced	such	an	investigation,	it	would	be	required
to	abandon	it.	While	this	process	has	only	been	used	rarely,	in	principle,	it	is	available	under	EU	law.
Accordingly,	it	is	possible	that	the	current	or	some	future	government	might	introduce	in	domestic	legislation	a	power
similar	in	to	that	set	out	in	Article	108(2),	allowing	the	government	of	the	day	to	intervene	where	it	considers	it
appropriate	as	a	result	of	“exceptional	circumstances”	in	relation	to	particular	state	aid	measures.
Again,	the	concern	here	would	be	that	in	a	purely	domestic	context,	and	in	the	light	of	strong	hostile	public	sentiment
in	relation	to	certain	state	aid	decisions,	a	national	government	might	find	it	easier,	and	be	more	readily	inclined,	to
use	such	power,	than	an	EU	Member	State	would	or	could.
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Ultimately,	the	ability	of	a	national	government	to	initiate	parliamentary	procedures	and	amend	domestic	legislation	at
will	–	so	much	an	issue	in	the	context	of	the	Brexit	debate	–	is	potentially	the	Achilles’	heel	of	a	domestic	state	aid
regulatory	system.	Whilst	other	aspects	of	national	competition	law	have	long	since	been	established	and	are
universally	accepted	as	fundamental	in	regulating	the	behaviour	of	businesses,	for	the	benefit	of	consumers,	state
aid	regulation	is	more	likely	to	divide	opinion.	This	factor	also,	therefore,	points	to	the	risk	of	state	intervention	in	state
aid	regulation	being	far	greater	in	a	purely	domestic	setting	than	in	the	context	of	an	international	system	where
states	voluntarily	accept	the	jurisdiction	of	a	supranational	regulator	to	authorise	or	prohibit	their	state	aid	measures.
Is	there	a	way	of	addressing	these	challenges?	Yes,	there	is.	The	should	disappear	if	state	aid	regulation	forms	an
integral	part	of	a	future	UK-EU	trade	agreement	which	provides
(a)	for	the	UK	to	maintain	a	common	state	aid	rulebook	with	the	EU;	and
(b)	for	the	domestic	state	aid	regulator	to	consider	also	the	extent	to	which	an	aid	measure	might	affect	trade	not	only
within	the	UK	but	also	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.
It	is	notable	that	there	would	seem	to	be	a	significant	meeting	of	minds	on	this	issue.	Both	the	EU27,	in	the	context	of
numerous	statements	since	June	2016,	and	the	UK	Government,	most	recently	in	the	context	of	the	government’s
Brexit	White	Paper,	have	indicated,	directly	or	indirectly,	a	mutual	desire	for	a	common	state	aid	rulebook	to	be	part
of	a	future	UK-EU	free	trade	agreement.	It	is	to	be	hoped	that	this	would	indeed,	be	the	case.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	A	longer	version	appeared
at	Eversheds	Sutherland.
Dr	Totis	Kotsonis	is	a	competition	and	EU	law	partner	at	Eversheds	Sutherland,	recognised	for	his	particular
expertise	in	public	procurement,	state	aid	and	regulatory	law,	including	aviation,	rail	and	energy	regulation.	He	has	a
PhD	from	the	LSE.
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